![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() #LEARNING ON THE JOB OPTIMAL CONTRACT PLUS#Our analysis applies to the design and allocation of aid contracts, research funding, and creative jobs. optimal central-bank incentives.5 While the use of a state-contingent wage contract is convenient for determining the optimal incentive structure, the specific in-stitutional structure that might implement these incentives is only briefly touched upon in this paper. also true that the optimal contract offered to a worker often depends. Apply to Contract Optimal Plus jobs available on, the worlds largest job site. In environments in which agents’ drive is unknown, missions will be less agent-preferred and the organization will find it optimal to offer contract menus that may be implemented via scoring auctions when there are competing agents. Missions will be more agent-preferred in environments in which effort is noncontractible. Our main results highlight that how far the organization chooses to move from its preferred mission depends on the contractual environment in which it operates. The principal’s and the agents’ mission preferences are misaligned and the agents vary in the intensity of their mission drive. We show that this contracting problem can be reformulated as a simple arianvt of our baseline model, so that our basic intuition extends. Second, we consider optimal contracts if the agent incurs a cost to engage in risk-taking that is increasing in the ariancev of that risk. We analyze a model in which a principal offers a contract to an agent for the development of a project and can influence the agent’s marginal return of effort through the choice of project mission. linear contract is again optimal in this setting. This paper studies how organizations can choose a mission to attract, incentivize, and screen their workers. Empirical evidence suggests that workers care about the mission of their job, in addition to their wage. ![]()
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